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Eye tracking is used to investigate decision makers’ motivations and procedures in choice 
problems. Patterns of eye movements in problems where the deliberation process is easily 
discernable are used to understand the deliberation in other problems. We find that in problems 
which involve the distribution of income between the participant and another individual, 
participants who behave selfishly nevertheless take into consideration the size of the payment to 
the other person. In problems that involve choice between two simple lotteries, eye movements 
indicate that many participants based their decision on a comparison of prizes and probabilities 
rather than making an expected utility calculation. 
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1. Introduction 
Neuroeconomics is a relatively new field in which researchers utilize information created non-
intentionally by decision makers in order to learn about the decision-making process in economic 
problems. The types of information used in Neuroeconomics include neural activity in the brain 
(as manifested in hemodynamic response and measured by fMRI), eye movements (as recorded 
by an eye tracker) and response time. The deliberation process and motivations of decision 
makers are of interest in and of themselves. Neuroeconomics aims that its experimental results 
will be the base for formalization of reasonable assumptions for models that involve procedural 
and behavioral elements of decision making. Whether research in Neuroeconomics is indeed 
capable of making a fundamental contribution to Economics is currently a subject of intense 
debate which will not be discussed here (see the articles in Caplin and Schotter (2008) and the 
special issue of Economics and Philosophy (2008)).  
In this study, we chose to focus exclusively on eye tracking since it provides information that 
is relatively easy to interpret, even without knowledge about the structure and function of the 
brain.  Previous work that used eye movements to study decision making was carried out already 
in the 70s
1 and also in recent years.
2 Other methods of tracking decision makers’ deliberations 
are also available. For example, in MouseLab information is hidden behind boxes on the 
computer screen and the participant accesses the information by moving the cursor over the 
boxes (see Payne et al. (1993) and http://www.mouselabweb.org). The two methods are 
compared in the conclusion section. 
The research strategy is as follows: In the first stage, we analyse the eye movements of 
decision makers in “base cases”, in which the deliberation process is straightforward. The base 
                                                 
1 Early studies include Russo and Rosen (1975), which studied multi-alternative choice, and Russo and Dosher 
(1983), which investigated multi-attribute binary choice and concluded that feature-by-feature comparisons make up 
much of the decision procedure. 
2 Recent papers include Wang et al. (2006), which found that senders in a sender-receiver game look much more on 
their own payoff and that their pupils tend to dilate when sending false messages, and Reutskaja et al. (2008) which 
found that when selecting among snack foods under extreme time pressure and option overload participants execute 
a relatively efficient search procedure. -   3   -  
cases are used to verify that the eye movements reflect the deliberation procedure in the way that 
we assume. The second stage involves “test cases”, in which the choice process is difficult to 
discern. In this stage, we compare the participants’ eye movements in the test cases to those in 
the base cases. When the pattern of eye movements in the test case resembles what was observed 
in one of the base cases, we conclude that the choice procedure used was similar to that used in 
the base case.  
This strategy is applied to two research questions. The first involves choice between two 
payment schemes, each of which specifies two amounts of money -- one to be paid to the 
participant and the other to an anonymous individual. We are interested in investigating whether 
people who make the “selfish” choice, i.e. the scheme in which they receive the higher payment, 
are being purely selfish or have arrived at the selfish decision after considering the effect of their 
choice on the size of the payment to the other individual. 
The second research question involves choice between simple lotteries, each described by an 
amount of money and a probability of obtaining it. We attempt to determine whether decision 
makers evaluate each of the alternatives separately -- a choice strategy that is likely to be 
consistent with expected utility maximization -- or whether the decision is reached by comparing 
prizes and probabilities separately.  
Note that we are not interested here in the participants' final decisions, per se. Gathering data 
on behavior and judgment can be done more effectively by using standard experimental 
techniques with a much larger and diverse sample. Our focus is on using information on choice 
and eye movements to understand processes that are difficult to track using other methods. 
 
2. Method 
Participants were asked to respond to a sequence of simple virtual choice problems. In each 
problem, a participant was asked to choose between pairs of alternatives labeled Left (L) and 
Right (R). Each decision problem was presented on a unique screen (Figure 1), in which the two 
parameters that describe the L alternative, a and b, appear in the upper and lower left-hand parts -   4   -  
of the screen and the two parameters that characterize the R alternative, c and d, appear in the 













Figure 1: Schematic representation of the screen shown to the participants. 
The problems used in the study (numbered here according to their order of appearance) were 
of the following types: 
(1) Sums: The parameters are integers. The question is "Which is the larger sum: a+b or c+d?". 
(2) Differences: The parameters are integers. The question is "Which difference is larger: a–b or 
c–d?". 
(3) Risk preferences: The parameters a and c are dollar amounts while b and d are probabilities. 
The question is "Which lottery would you choose: $a with probability b or $c with probability 
d?". 
(4) Time preferences: The parameters a and c are dollar amounts and b and d are dates. The 
question is "Which would you prefer: to receive $a at time b or $c at time d?". 
(5) Social preferences: The participant was asked to imagine that he and another hypothetical 
student had completed a task together, with equal effort invested by each of them, and that he is 
to choose between two compensation schemes.
3 The parameters are dollar amounts. The question 
is “Which scheme would you choose: $a for you and $b for the other student or $c for you and 
$d for the other student?”. 
The choice was made by clicking on either the left or the right mouse buttons. No time 
restrictions were imposed on the participants. A typical median response time was eight seconds. 
                                                 
3 The participant was told that he does not know the other student, that he will never meet him again and that the 
other student will never know what the participant’s compensation was or that he had chosen between two schemes. -   5   -  
The 47 participants
4 were paid a show-up fee which was equivalent to about $12; there were 
no further rewards during the experiment. 
We continuously recorded the point of gaze (i.e. where the person is looking).
5 Figure 2 
provides examples of the eye movement paths for four participants who were comparing 
differences (251–222 vs. 187–153). 
Analyzing the huge amount of recorded data was not straightforward. Our first approach was 
to transform the data into movies showing the path of eye movement on the screen. Our hope 
was that the choice procedure would be evident from the movies. However, there were only a 
few such cases (an example can be watched at http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/ABR09/).
6 Rather, a 
diversity of transition sequences was observed and in general it was difficult to interpret the eye 
movements on the level of the individual. Therefore, we turned to analyzing the aggregated data.  
Our analysis was based on the path of the participant's gaze between the different parts of the 
screen. The screen was divided into four sections: Top Left, Top Right, Bottom Left and Bottom 
Right. Eye movements between two sections were classified into one of six categories: Left-
Vertical, Right-Vertical, Top-Horizontal, Bottom-Horizontal, Descending-Diagonal and 
Ascending-Diagonal. 
 
                                                 
4 The participants (24 males and 23 females; average age of 27) all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
were students (in fields other than economics) at the Weizmann Institute and the Faculty of Agriculture of the 
Hebrew University, which are both in Rehovot, Israel. An informed consent form was obtained from all the 
participants, in accordance with the approved Declaration of Helsinki for this project. 
5 We used a high-speed eye-tracking system (iView) made by SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI). The iView system 
is based on an infrared light camera (thus enabling recordings to be made in complete darkness). It captures (at a 
sampling frequency of 240Hz or one sample every 4.2 milliseconds) a high-resolution image of the pupil and 
corneal reflection. The recorded data is used to compute the absolute gaze position in terms of screen coordinates. 
The few observations in which the absolute gaze position was not identified by the eye tracker for more than 20% of 
the total time until the participant responded were omitted from the analysis. 
6 The participant in this case was asked to compare a+b to c+d. It is clear that at first he tried to calculate d–b and 
a–c using horizontal eye movements; at some point he realized that the answer can be derived more easily by 
comparing d–a to b–c , which requires diagonal eye movements. -   6   -  
 
Figure 2: Eye movements of four participants while solving problem #32, in which they compared differences 
(251–222 vs. 187–153). The time sequence is divided into four equal segments and the order indicated by color: 
purple  blue  green  red. The purple and red dots indicate eye position at the beginning and end of the 
process, respectively. 
For each problem and each participant, we calculated the proportion of time spent in each of 
the six types of eye movements. We noticed that participants tend to gaze at the option they 
chose just before they click on the mouse and therefore we omitted the last half-second of every 
observation. We also omitted any period for which the eye tracker did not identify the eye 
position, which was usually the result of blinking. Finally, in order to enable identification of 
diagonal movements, which always pass briefly through another section of the screen, we 
omitted any period in which the participant's gaze did not stay in a particular section for at least 
50 msec.
7 
                                                 
7 50 msec was found to be effective in distinguishing between eye fixation and an eye movement passing through a 
section of the screen without stopping. -   7   -  
We calculated the proportion of time spent by a participant in responding to a certain 
problem in each of the six eye movements as follows: 
(i) Let 0 be the point in time at which the problem is first presented and T be the point in time at 
which the participant clicked on the mouse. 
(ii) Denote the transition times between sections of the screen by: t1, t2, …, tk, …, tn. 
(iii) The segment of time [0,T-0.5] is divided into n intervals: 
[0, (t1 + t2)/2], [(t1 + t2)/2, (t2 + t3)/2], …...,[(tn-1 + tn)/2,T-0.5]. The duration of the k’th interval 
(k=1,..,n) is credited to the total for the eye movement that occurred at time tk. 
(iv) By dividing the time credited to each category of eye movement by the total of all the eye 
movements, we obtain the MTP (Movement-Time-Proportion) vector consisting of six numbers 
representing the proportion of time spent in each movement. 
(v) We averaged the MTPs over all participants for each problem and denoted this vector of 
averages as α. 
We also produced a similar vector for the number of transitions. In this case, each transition 
contributes a value of 1 to the corresponding eye movement total. Dividing by the total number 
of transitions, we obtain the MTC (Movement-Count-Proportion) vector and averaging over all 
participants we obtain a statistic we denote as β.
8 The two measures gave almost identical results, 
thus reducing the concern that the results were spurious.  
In this approach, high α-values for the two vertical movements imply that participants’ 
choices were based on holistic operations, which relate to each alternative as a separate entity. 
High α-values for the horizontal movements indicate that participants based their decisions on 
comparing each of the features of the alternatives separately.
9  
                                                 
8 We added the β measure as a response to a potential criticism that α is sensitive to variation in the level of 
difficulty in understanding the question's parameters (e.g., if one of the parameters takes a long time to read, this 
will lengthen the duration of the movement into and out of that section of the screen). 
9 Russo and Rosen (1975) and Russo and Dosher (1983) based their analysis on counting movements from one 
section of the screen, X, to another, Y, and back to X.  In contrast, we base our analysis on counting movements 
from X to Y even if there is no return to X.  In problems where the response time is relatively long, the two 
… -   8   -  
 
3. Choice involving Social Preferences 
The first part of the study consisted of problems involving social preference, in which the 
participant was asked to choose between two compensation schemes -- one appearing on the left 
of the screen and the other on the right. For each scheme the payment to the participant was 
shown in the Top section of the screen and the other student's payment was shown in the Bottom 
section.  
Following are some considerations that might guide a decision maker’s choice in such a 
problem: 
"Selfishness": The participant cares only about his own compensation. This is likely to be 
manifested in mostly Top-Horizontal movements. 
"Fairness": The participant cares about the distribution of income between him and the other 
student and prefers a more egalitarian distribution. This consideration will lead to vertical eye 
movements. 
“Aversion to Getting Less”: The participant is averse to getting less than the other student. This 
consideration should also lead to vertical eye movements. 
“Utilitarianism”: The participant wishes to maximize the combined income of the two students 
(or perhaps a weighted sum). This procedure can involve either vertical movements (when 
computing the sums) or horizontal movements (in determining whether his gain is greater than 
the other student's loss). A particular case of the Utilitarianism motivation is “Domination”, in 
which the participant prefers a scheme that provides more income for both him and the other 
student. Domination is expected to yield horizontal movements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
approaches yield the same qualitative results.  In problems where the response time is relatively short, the former 
method does not yield sufficient data to make significant inferences. -   9   -  
Step 1: The base case  
The base case for this part of the study is #77:    
$224 for you  $271 for you 
$224 for the other student  $226 for the other student 
The only possible motivation for the choice of L in this problem is egalitarianism. The 36 
participants who answered this problem were split evenly in their choices. Such preferences for 
an egalitarian outcome may seem unlikely but are in fact in line with recent findings on 
inequality aversion among non-economists (see Fehr et al. (2006)). 
Figure 3 presents the eye movements for eight participants (four who chose L and four who 
chose R) for whom eye movements could be clearly interpreted. Such cases were however not 
common. 
 
Figure 3: Eye movements for eight participants while responding to problem #77 (choosing between the 
compensation schemes $224,$224 and $271,$226): Top row: four participants who chose the "fair" option (L). 
Bottom row: four participants who chose the “selfish” option (R).  
Table 1 presents the α-values (and in parenthesis the  -values) for the participants who 
chose L and for those who chose R. The information on diagonal movements was omitted since 
their proportion of the total was negligible.  -   10   -  
Participants who chose L in #77  Participants who chose R in #77 
$224  19% (21%)  $271  $224  43% (42%)  $271 
34% (34%)  34%  (32%) 15%  (16%)  26%  (23%) 
$224  7% (8%)  $226 $224  14% (15%)  $226 
Table 1: α’s (and β’s) for participants who chose L and R in #77. Location within the cell corresponds to type of 
movement. Arrows are drawn such that their thickness is proportional to the α-values. 
The α-values for the participants who chose L and for those who chose R are dramatically 
different.
10 The former spent 68% of their time in vertical movements.  The latter spent 57% in 
horizontal movements, with most of that in Top-Horizontal movements, which is consistent with 
their choice of the selfish alternative. 
 
Step 2: The test case  
In the following two problems, the choice procedure is not easily determined. 
In #73, 87% of the 38 participants chose L when presented with the following screen: 
$91 for you  $87 for you 
$82 for the other student  $110 for the other student 
In #74, 76% of the 38 participants chose L when presented with the following screen: 
$117 for you  $89 for you 
$94 for the other student  $98 for the other student 
The choice of L in #73 could be the result of selfish considerations, but could also be the 
result of fairness considerations. In #74, the fairer scheme is R. The choice of L could be the 
result of selfishness alone or of deliberation that also takes into account the other student’s 
                                                 
10 P < 0.01 on a Wilcoxon test. -   11   -  
compensation. Eye movements can provide a hint as to the participants’ motivations in this case. 
Tables 2a and 2b present the α's for the participants who chose L in #73 and #74: 
Participants who chose L in #73 
$91  24% (25%)  $87 
31% (32%)  28%  (27%) 
$82  10% (11%)  $110 
Table 2a: α’s (β’s in parentheses) for those who chose L in #73.  
Participants who chose L in #74 
$117  23% (23%)  $89 
29% (30%)  33%  (31%) 
$94  7% (8%)  $98 
Table 2b: α‘s (β’s in parentheses) for those who chose L in #74. 
 
Step 3: Comparing the test case to the base case 
There is a striking similarity between the eye movement patterns of those who chose L in #73 
and #74 and those who chose L in #77. Therefore, one could infer that the considerations of 
those who chose L in both problems were not purely selfish.  
Those who chose L in #73 may be exhibiting a preference for Fairness or Aversion to Getting 
Less. Those who chose L in #74 may be exhibiting Aversion to Getting Less or Utilitarianism.  
However, given the high proportion of vertical movements among those who chose L in #74, it 
seems unlikely that a large proportion of the participants were guided by Utilitarianism since 
they would have quickly noticed the horizontal differences and would not have needed to 
compute the vertical sums.   
 -   12   -  
Step 4: More about the significance of the base case 
Our analysis is based on the partition of the participants between those who chose L in #77 
(denoted #77L) and those who chose R (denoted #77R). These two groups appear to have 
responded differently in other problems of this type. The time devoted to vertical movements by 
participants who chose L in #77 was consistently longer -- by 10%-25% -- than for those who 
chose R in #77 (see Table 3). 
Figure 4 clearly shows the difference in eye movements between the #77L and #77R groups. 
Each data point represents a participant and its color indicates his choice in #77 (blue for L and 
red for R). The position on the diagram indicates the proportion of time spent by the participant 
on horizontal and vertical movements. It is evident that members of #77L display patterns of 
deliberation that are systematically distinct from the patterns of members of #77R (i.e. the blue 
points tend to be above the red points). 
Types of Eye-Movements: 
    






























23% 13% 29% 20% 31% 46% 12% 15% 
Table 3: α’s in all social preferences problems (#73-#78) for participants who chose L or R in #77. -   13   -  
Figure 4: Proportions of horizontal and vertical movements in problems #73-#78 
The two populations also differ in terms of behavior. Participants who chose R in #74 appear 
to give greater consideration to fairness. This alternative was chosen by 44% of the #77L group 
but by only 5% of the #77R group. The choice of L in #75 is also associated with fairness and 
was chosen by all of the #77L group but by only 38% of the #77R group. Similarly, in #78 all of 
the #77L group chose R vs. only 40% of the #77R group. 
 
4. Choice Under Uncertainty 
The second part of the study involves problems in which the participants were asked to choose 
between two simple lotteries: 
$X1  $X2 
With probability p1  With probability p2 
Experiments involving such decision problems constitute the basis for much of the literature 
on decision making under uncertainty. One can postulate two main procedures used by decision 
makers who confront such a choice problem: 
a) Computing the expected payoff (or the expectation of a transformation of the payoff) for each -   14   -  
of the lotteries and then choosing the lottery with the higher expectation.
11 Applying such a 
procedure involves vertical eye movements. 
b) Comparing the prizes and the probabilities separately. In the case that there is a conflict 
between the probability and prize dimensions, the choice is made according to which difference 
is perceived as more significant by the decision maker. In particular, if the decision maker 
detects similarity between the parameters in one dimension but not in the other, he will base his 
decision on the dimension lacking similarity (for a formal presentation of this procedure, see 
Rubinstein (1988)). Applying such a procedure involves horizontal eye movements. 
A high proportion of vertical eye movements will be considered evidence that an expected 
payoff was calculated. A high proportion of horizontal eye movements will be taken to mean that 
prizes and probabilities were compared separately. In order to get some idea of the amount of 
time invested in each of these two main procedures, two base cases were analyzed: 
 
Step 1: Base Case I  
The first base case consisted of problems that involve the comparison of the difference between 
two numbers on the left side of the screen to the difference between two numbers on the right 
side (see Table 4). 
#  The differences  % of choices  - values 
















22% 78% 19% 21% 36% 19%  3%  2% 
Table 4: α-values for #32-34.  
                                                 
11 Some of the studies in the Neuroeconomics literature claim to have found evidence of such expected utility 
calculations in fMRI data (Glimcher et al. (2008)). -   15   -  
In #32, the most straightforward procedure involves actually computing the differences using 
vertical movements. Indeed, vertical movements accounted for 82% of the time spent on this 
problem. Problem #33 is not as simple and 68% of the participants chose the wrong answer (this 
is the only case in the experiment in which the majority of participants chose the wrong answer). 
The  α of vertical movements declined to 72% since many participants used horizontal 
comparisons in an attempt to simplify the problem (though this computational route is not much 
easier). In #34, it is easier to answer the question by calculating the horizontal differences and as 
a result the share of vertical movements declined to 40%. 
Figure 5 presents examples of two typical participants. Note that in #32 they used vertical 
movements almost exclusively while in #34 horizontal movements dominate. In #33, we observe 
a mixture of horizontal and vertical movements. 
Figure 5: Eye movements for two participants (each row represents one participant) while responding to #32, #33 
and #34.  -   16   -  
Step 2: Base case II  
The second base case consisted of problems that involve time preference. The participants were 
asked to choose between receiving a particular sum of money on a certain date and a different 
sum of money on a different date. Table 5 summarizes the data for three such problems. 
In this case, it is hard to imagine that any of the participants were making "present-value-
like" computations that require vertical movements. It seems clear that they based their decisions 
on the separate comparison of sums of money and delivery dates. Indeed, we find that 2/3 of eye 
movements were horizontal in these problems. 
  The alternatives  % of choices  - values 
















On 13-Apr-2009  74% 26% 12% 15% 25% 44%  2%  2% 
Table 5: α's for time preference problems. Experiments took place during June-September 2008.  
 
Step 3: The test case  
The test case involved problems of choice under uncertainty. The data is summarized in Table 6, 
where the shaded background indicates problems for which the α-values were relatively high.  
Note that in problems where the calculation of the expectation appears to be relatively 
simple, the proportion of vertical movements was higher by about 10% than in problems where it 
was relatively difficult. 
 -   17   -  
  The lotteries  % of 
choices 
AMTPs 
#  L = (x1,p1)  R = (x2,p2)  %L % R 
   
36  ($3000, 0.15)  ($4000, 0.11)  60% 40% 24% 22% 19% 28%  4%  2% 
37 ($1700,0.4)  ($1300,0.5)  51% 49% 19% 26% 25% 24%  4%  2% 
38 ($637,0.649)  ($549,0.732)  41% 59% 16% 17% 30%  30%  2% 4% 
39 ($3000,0.9)  ($4000,0.66)  97% 3%  18% 15% 28%  31%  4% 4% 
40 ($3100,1/5)  ($1740,1/3)  51% 49% 17% 20% 26%  31%  3%  2% 
41 ($5283,0.27)  ($5279,0.269)  92% 8%  13% 13% 39%  31%  2% 2% 
42  ($735,on a roll of 6)  ($280,on a roll of even)  11% 89% 21% 26% 24% 22%  5%  2% 
43 ($5100,0.6)  ($5825,0.8)  3%  97% 13% 24% 32%  22%  4%  4% 
44 ($13600,0.3)  ($15500,0.2)  37% 63% 17% 18% 34%  26%  3% 2% 
45 ($6666,0.6)  ($4444,0.8)  28% 72% 18% 23% 27%  26%  3%  3% 
Table 6: α‘s for all participants in each lottery choice problem.  
 
Step 4: Comparing the test case to the base cases  
We now compare the eye-tracking data for the choice between lotteries (the test case) with data 
from Base Case I (comparison of differences) and Base Case II (time preference). The main 
features of the data can be seen in Tables 7a and 7b which present the eye-movement transition 
diagrams for problem #36 (choice between lotteries), #32 (comparison of differences) and #56 
(time preference).  
Participants who chose L in #36  Participants who chose R in #36 
$3000  20% (25%)  $4000 $3000  17% (22%)  $4000 
28% (29%)  19%  (17%) 19%  (19%)  28%  (27%) 
P 0.15  26% (23%)  P 0.11  P 0.15  31% (26%)  P 0.11 
Table 7a: AMTPs and AMTCs for participants who chose L and R in #36. -   18   -  
All participants in #32  All participants in #56 
251  12% (13%)  187 $500.00  25% (32%)  $508.00 
38% (37%)  44%  (42%) 12%  (13%)  15%  (16%) 
222  4% (5%)  153 On  13-Jan  44% (34%)  On 13-Apr 
Table 7b: AMTPs and AMTCs for all participants in #32 and #56. 
Eye movements in the test case were not similar to those in either of the base cases and fell 
somewhere in between them. More generally, the average proportion of vertical movements in 
all of the problems in the test case ranged from 26-47% which is well below the proportions in 
#32 and #33. 
The  α-values in the choice of lotteries are most similar to those in #34 in which the 
participants made a complicated comparison of differences. However, the problem was 
structured in such a way that the answer is easily obtained by horizontal calculations (a is smaller 
than c and b is greater than d).  
The fact that the eye movements in the choice of lotteries are most similar to those in #34 
seem to indicate that when choosing between simple lotteries the participants usually relied on 
comparing prizes and probabilities separately. However, the proportion of time spent in 
horizontal movements in the lottery problems is less than in the problems of Base Case II, where 
it is clear that participants used a similarity-based procedure. It appears that although in lottery 
problems participants focus heavily on the comparison of prizes and probabilities, they do not 
employ a procedure that is purely similarity-based. 
If account is also taken of the variation between the different problems of the test case, it 
appears that when the expectation calculation is relatively difficult participants use a similarity-
based comparison; otherwise they use a mixture of the two procedures.  -   19   -  
 
Step 5: Further evidence  
Further evidence for the intensive use of the similarity-based procedure in the choice between 
lotteries was found through a separate group of problems in which participants again chose 
between two simple lotteries but in which the locations of the probability and dollar amount on 
the right side of the screen (R) were switched: 
$X1  With probability p2 
With probability p1  $X2 
In all the problems presented up to this point, the α’s of the diagonal movements were 
negligible (see Tables 4, 5 and 6). Diagonal movements are not normally characteristic of the 
stage in which a participant is simply absorbing the data and therefore, they appear only if they 
have some computational role. They did not have a n y  s u c h  r o l e  i n  t h e  t e s t  a n d  b a s e  c a s e  
problems and therefore are not observed. In contrast, diagonal movements were used, sometimes 
heavily, in the current set of problems (see Table 8), which indicates that the participants 
compared prizes to prizes and probabilities to probabilities.
12 Figure 6 presents typical eye 
movements for two participants responding to #49. 
                                                 
12 We avoid comparing the intensity of the diagonal movements to that of the vertical or horizontal movements since 
this would require setting up a specially designed calibration which we did not do. -   20   -  
  The lotteries  % of choices AMTPs 































$652  68% 32% 17%  20%  13%  10%   18%  22%  
Table 8: α‘s for all participants in the lottery choice problems with diagonal layout.  
 
Figure 6: Eye movements of two participants (40 and 42) while solving problem #49.  
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5. Discussion 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: In social preference problems, when 
behavior can be interpreted as being motivated by either selfishness or social considerations, eye 
movements provided evidence that participants were not motivated solely by selfishness. In 
choice under uncertainty, evidence was found that participants make their choices based on 
comparing the prizes and the probabilities separately and that a greater degree of difficulty in 
computing the expectation of the lotteries reinforces this tendency. 
There are three main alternative methods to approach the research question: 
1) Observation of behavior: One could confront the participants with additional choice problems 
with the aim of exposing the motives behind their choices. There is an inherent difficulty with 
this approach in the context of the issues discussed in this paper. The social preferences part of 
our study was designed to determine whether participants who behave selfishly decide to do so 
after considering the social consequences or whether they care only about themselves. 
Obviously, behavior cannot shed light on this question. Similarly, the risk preference part of the 
study aims to determine whether subjects utilize an expected-utility-like calculation or a 
procedure based on similarity concepts.  As shown in Rubinstein (1988), behavior that is 
consistent with a preference relation cannot distinguish between these two theories of choice. 
2) MouseLab: This method has the advantage of being able to gather data on a large number of 
participants. Although MouseLab has some attractive features, it requires that the participant 
make a conscious decision at each stage with regard to the order in which he looks into the 
information boxes; in contrast, eye tracking is able to follow movements that are non-intentional. 
In addition, the need to move the mouse in MouseLab prolongs the decision making process and 
induces an unnaturally systematic information acquisition behavior (Lohse and Johnson, 1996). 
3) Asking the subjects:  A straightforward way of obtaining information is to simply ask 
participants what was going on in their mind during the decision-making process. However, it is 
well known that participants' answers are based on a subjective reconstruction of the experience 
that may or may not correlate with the actual process that took place (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). 
Overall, we find eye tracking to be an intuitive and relatively simple tool that can be used to 
study decision-making processes. Whether findings from studies such as ours will influence -   22   -  
Economic Theory remains to be seen, but in our opinion there are many problems on which the 
current method of research can shed light. One such an example has to do with a regularity we 
spotted in the data: Participants' eye movements were quite consistent in the various social 
preference problems, whereas in the risk preference problems we noticed a shift from vertical to 
horizontal movements when the calculation of the expectations became more difficult.  Do 
people use a more consistent procedure when making decisions that have a moral component? 
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